"...we came
up with Brokenbrough's brigade about half way up the hill, lying down. I ordered
my men to march over them, they did so...."
--Brig. Gen. Alfred Scales about July 1, 1863 (1)
"Col. Brockenbrough's Va. Brigade ought to have been on my left, but it
refused to advance."
--Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis about July 3, 1863 (2)
A total of thirty-seven
Confederate infantry brigades participated in the battle of Gettysburg. Most
performed well and earned a lasting name for themselves. A handful of others
reaped the scorn of their comrades. One of the most prominent in this group
was Col. John Brockenbrough's brigade of Virginians of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's
division.
As the brigade trudged toward Gettysburg, there was a general malaise in the
ranks. A veteran unit composed of the 40th, 47th, 55th regiments and 22nd Virginia
Battalion, it had fought in all of the army's campaigns since the Seven Days
Battles. Now it was but a skeleton of its former self,
numbering about a thousand muskets. (3)
Also unsettling was the instability of the command structure. The brigade's
original commander, Brig. Gen. Charles Field, had been severely wounded at Second
Manassas, and Col. Robert Mercer Brockenbrough of the 40th Virginia had temporarily
taken his place. A graduate of the Virginia Military Academy and later a farmer,
Brockenbrough led the brigade during the battles at Chantilly, Antietam, and
Fredericksburg. As late as the latter campaign, noted Southern historian Douglas
S. Freeman called the brigade "excellent." Prior to the Chancellorsville
campaign, General Heth was officially named the brigade's commander, and Brockenbrough
returned to the 40th Virginia. Brockenbrough was again assigned temporary command
of the brigade with the elevation of Heth to division command. According to
Freeman, Brockenbrough was not suited for permanent command, but "could
be counted upon to keep together a command sadly reduced in numbers." How
Brockenbrough coped with these slights is not known, but he must have been ambivalent
about reassuming command of the brigade again on a temporary basis. Unlike some
brigade commanders, Brockenbrough probably rode toward Gettysburg knowing that
whatever he did there would have little impact on his future.(4)
The brigade was a tired, worn-out unit. One that needed to have time to recuperate,
but instead found itself marching toward the greatest challenge in its existence.
Matters would not be helped by the instability of the command structure. Brockenbrough
was depressed by his fluctuating status and when the brigade needed him most,
he would not provide the leadership the men deserved.
This overall malaise can be witnessed in the soldiers'
questionable behavior during the march north. One man from the 47th Virginia
wrote home, "We are now in the enimy cuntry we know not what will befall
us for some of our solders have done mity bad since they have ben here but orders
was read out last eavning prohibiting any private property being taken...."
Tom Luttrell of the 40th Virginia wrote, "Inhabitants alarmed. Bad behavior
in our troops, plundering &c."(5)
Heth's division was encamped around Cashtown, Pennsylvania, on June 29. The
lack of confidence in Brockenbrough and his men was again illustrated here when
Brockenbrough ordered the 55th Virginia out along the Chambersburg Pike toward
Gettysburg to perform picket duty. Brockenbrough took extreme pains to inform
the regiment's commander, Col. William Christian, "not to mistake friends
from foes, that we probably might meet some of Ewell's command or Stuart's."
Christian admitted that the order contained, "a great deal more that was
not very clear to me." Needing clarification, Christian rode back to see
Brockenbrough. "Col. B. told me he knew no more than I did, that it was
an exact copy of an order he had gotten from Gen. Heth." In a typical situation,
that would have ended the matter, but Christian apparently did not trust Brockenbrough,
and decided to go directly to Heth. The division commander was not any more
helpful, informing Christian that the order had originated from Lt. Gen. A.
P. Hill. It was getting late, and the sun was setting, so Christian reluctantly
turned his horse around and rode back to his waiting regiment. Marching about
a mile and a half along the pike, he halted his men for the evening. (6)
The regiment spent an uneventful night along the road and were in the process
of consuming a breakfast of "confiscated chickens" when Christian
observed "a considerable body of troops advancing from Cashtown."
This was part of Brig. Gen. James Pettigrew's brigade, on its way toward Gettysburg
on a reconnaissance/supply-gathering mission. According to Colonel Christian,
Pettigrew rode up to him with a request that he "attend him with my Regiment".
Christian immediately demurred, telling Pettigrew about his soldiers' sleepless
night along the road, and besides he had no such orders from his brigade commander.
Pettigrew readily admitted that, "he had no right to command in my presence..."
We will never know if Christian was also concerned about what lay ahead and
how his men would respond to an encounter with the enemy. Pettigrew was not
easily deterred however, and told Christian that while his North Carolinians
were splendidly drilled and equipped," they were inexperienced, and he
would like nothing better than to have a veteran unit accompany them on their
journey. Pettigrew, having been wounded and captured on May 31, 1862, at Seven
Pines, was new to the army as it was now constituted, and so one can wonder
whether he was serious, or if it was a ploy to get Christian to comply with
his request. Either way, Christian "readily consented to go," and
all set off toward Gettysburg.(7)
It was a fairly uneventful march for the mixed column of veterans and green
troops. However, as it neared Gettysburg, Federal cavalry were encountered which
led Pettigrew to send a courier to Christian to "call me back, and said
that he had found out all he came for." (8)
Brockenbrough's brigade marched toward Gettysburg at 5:00 a.m. on July 1. This
time, it was the third brigade in Heth's column, situated behind James J. Archer's
and Joseph R. Davis' units. Pettigrew's brigade brought up the rear. Despite
the fact that firing could be heard up ahead at about 10:00 a.m., Brockenbrough's
men did not expect a fight. Well in front of them were Archer' s men, hidden
by the thick growth surrounding Willoughby Run. The intensity of the firing
soon increased around the creek, and Brockenbrough was ordered to file his brigade
to the right of the road. After the men had completed this movement, they could
hear their officers yelling, "left face, load."(9)
In a short time, Brockenbrough's men could see Archer's men erupting from the
woods, with the victorious Federal Iron Brigade close behind. Instinctively,
Brockenbrough's men raised their rifle-muskets to fire into the advancing Federals,
but were prevented from doing so because of the "flying Tennesseans."
Realizing that it was too late to help Archer's men, Heth ordered Brockenbrough's
men back to Herr's Ridge. (10)
Quiet now settled on the battlefield, as Heth was ordered to wait until Lee
gave permission to reopen the fighting in this sector. During this time the
men rested and ate whatever was in their haversacks. Orders to advance arrived
around 2:00 p.m., and with Pettigrew's brigade on its right, the brigade moved
slowly toward Willoughby Run, deployed from left to right: 55th , 47th, 40th,
and 22nd Virginia Battalion. The Iron Brigade had been pulled back to its original
positions in and around Herbst's Woods on McPherson's Ridge by this time, so
these troops could not be seen through the thickets. This generated much uneasiness
among Brockenbrough's veterans in the right regiments, as they did not want
to repeat the blunder committed by Archer's men a few scant hours before. The
left flank of Brockenbrough's brigade had open fields in front of them. They
were therefore able to see the deadly struggle going on along Chambersburg Pike
between Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel's brigade of Robert Rodes' division, and Col.
Roy Stone's Pennsylvania bucktail brigade, a part of Doubleday's division, now
under the command of Brig. Gen. Thomas Rowley.
The Federal troops on McPherson's Ridge watched the advance of the two Confederate
brigades in grim silence. While the Iron Brigade had savaged Archer's brigade,
some of its regiments had taken heavy losses in the process. For example, the
2nd Wisconsin lost over thirty percent of its men as it charged toward the Tennesseans
and Alabamians. Over on its right, Colonel Stone had deployed virtually his
entire brigade, except for five companies from the 150th Pennsylvania, who were
left along Chambersburg Pike to face Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel's onslaught. This
left a gap in the Federal line between the McPherson barn and the right of the
Iron Brigade--a gap that the left flank of Brockenbrough's brigade was steadily
approaching. There were few additional troops to bolster the line, and the situation
looked grim for the Union defenders of McPherson's Ridge.(11)
Closely watching Brockenbrough's advance, Col. John Mansfield of the 2nd Wisconsin
saw the enemy approaching "in two lines, with a heavy line of skirmishers.
The front line of the enemy, with skirmishers, advanced directly to the front,
while the second line advanced obliquely to the left." The move was probably
made to close a gap that had opened between it and Pettigrew's brigade. The
brigade was now positioned to make a frontal attack against determined troops
on an elevated ridge.(12)
It appears that the 22nd Virginia Battalion and the 40th
Virginia on the right of Brockenbrough's line were positioned to take on the
2nd and 7th Wisconsin of the Iron Brigade, numbering about 550 men at this point
in the fight. The left of Brockenbrough's brigade, composed of the 47th Virginia
and 55th Virginia, approached the thinly manned gap in the line. Seeing this
large force approaching, the five companies of the 150th Pennsylvania that had
been facing north along the Chambersburg Pike, "with no undue excitement,
and in thoroughly good order ... wheeled back to its original position, facing
the west, leaving, however, a large gap between the left flank and the woods
[Herbst], which it was impossible to fill," recalled Maj. Thomas Chamberlin
of the 150th Pennsylvania. The movement took, "but a minute or two,"
and suddenly all 400 men of the 150th Pennsylvania confronted Brockenbrough's
left flank.(13)
There was really no need for the Pennsylvanians to rush,
as Brockenbrough's approach appeared to be slow and methodical. Major Chamberlin
wrote that, "for some unexplained reason the strong force approaching from
the west ... moderated its movements, as if awaiting developments on other portions
of the field, and by the time it came within musket reach our regiment was firmly
established in its new position." By not charging up the hill immediately
and throwing his two regiments upon the five companies from the 150th Pennsylvania,
Brockenbrough lost a golden opportunity to punch a hole in the Federal line
and force it off McPherson's Ridge. As a result, Brockenbrough's small, battle-weary,
and poorly-led brigade would be up against well-placed Federal troops on the
ridge, whose numbers roughly approximated its own. (14)
After dispersing the four companies of Federal skirmishers, Brockenbrough's
men slowly splashed across Willoughby Run about 2:30 p.m. The 150th Pennsylvania
with all its companies fronting west watched intently from behind a "stout"
fence. Waiting until the Virginians had crossed the stream and were climbing
McPherson's Ridge, the Pennsylvanians were at last ordered to open fire. Sheets
of flame erupted into the ranks of the 47th and 55th Virginia. When the smoke
cleared, Major Chamberlin could see that their opening volleys had "at
once checked the enemy's progress, but failed to scatter or confuse him."
Brockenbrough's men now halted and returned fire, which Chamberlin likened to
a "hail storm." He continued:
Back and forth, for a few minutes, swept the tempest of bullets.... Suddenly, as if elsewhere something decisive, for which they had been waiting, had occurred, our antagonists ceased firing, fell back a short distance, and obliquing to their right were soon hidden from view by the woods. (15)
In his official report,
Capt. George Jones of the 150th Pennsylvania, noted that, "The enemy's
infantry opened fire upon us as soon as we made our appearance, and we became
hotly engaged for some time, when the enemy's line was compelled to give way,
and they fled in confusion. A second line advanced and met the same fate."(16)
Brockenbrough's attack on the left of the Iron Brigade was equally unsuccessful.
After taking some losses, the men of the 40th Virginia and 22nd Virginia Battalion
crouched down in the thickets, and, according to Col. William Robinson of the
7th Wisconsin, sent a "galling fire" into the Iron Brigade. There
is little evidence, however, that Brockenbrough's men mounted a serious charge
against the Iron Brigade's well-defended position. (17)
It appears that Brockenbrough's men made two charges against
the 150th Pennsylvania on McPherson's Ridge. Neither could be categorized as
"spirited," and both failed. Looking behind them, Brockenbrough's
men could see Brig. Gen. Alfred Scales' brigade of Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender's
Division approach in support.(18)
About 3:00 p.m., the final chapter of the McPherson's Ridge battle was written.
According to Major Chamberlin, "The enemy drew nearer and nearer, firing
rapidly as he came, but was met by a resistance which time and again staggered
him, though it could not shake him off." Over on the right of the line,
Pettigrew's large brigade had found the Iron Brigade's left flank, and, after
a tremendous fight, had succeeded in driving the Federal troops from their positions.
A domino effect was set in motion, and soon the 2nd and 7th Wisconsin felt the
pressure on their left and front, and they too were forced to withdraw. Before
long, the tide reached the 150th Pennsylvania's position. Capt. George Jones
of the 150th Pennsylvania wrote in his official report that "A third and
much stronger line appeared in our front and on both flanks, which forced our
flanks to retire."(19)
As Brockenbrough's men approached the McPherson barn they
saw fifty dead Pennsylvanians in a straight line, marking the 150th Pennsylvania's
position on the ridge. Brockenbrough's men were fairly disorganized at this
point, and instead of reforming the ranks and following the enemy, Brockenbrough
was content to allow his men to lounge around McPherson's Ridge. Scales now
brought up his brigade, which pursued the enemy soldiers to Seminary Ridge.
Scales wrote with some disdain in his official report that, when he came upon
Brockenbrough's men, they had halted and were lying down. "The officers
on this part of the line informed me that they were without ammunition, and
would not advance farther." After the war, Scales wrote to John Bachelder
that, "we came up with Brokenbrough's brigade about half way up the hill,
lying down. I ordered my men to march over them, they did so...." Some
of Brockenbrough's men probably watched the destruction of Scales' brigade as
it threw itself against the fortified positions on Seminary Ridge. Most
were probably quite content to loiter around the McPherson farm instead.(20)
While resting around the barn, the men saw several Union soldiers running toward
them, carrying the flag of the 149th Pennsylvania. Jumping to their feet, they
fired into them, and Pvt. James Lumpkin of the 55th Virginia captured the flag.
He was later captured, and retained the flag during his internment at Fort Delaware
and Point Lookout. (21)
After the Federal troops were finally pushed off Seminary Ridge, Brockenbrough
ordered his men to follow Scales toward the town, scooping up scores of prisoners
along the way. Col. William Christian of the 55th Virginia estimated that his
men gathered as many Federal prisoners as there were soldiers in his regiment.
The brigade's losses on July 1 were modest--just under 150, or perhaps fifteen
percent of its strength. Contrasted with the horrendous losses of Pettigrew's
and Scales' brigades, which fought in the same sector, it is easy to understand
why Brockenbrough's contributions and exertions have been questioned. Perhaps
to deflect some of this criticism, Colonel Christian wrote after the war that,
"I think our Brigade (Brockenbrough's) did splendid work that day. I am
sure the 55th Va never done better and did as well as any Regiment could have
done." Christian's remarks actually reiterated Heth's official report,
which stated that "Brockenbrough's Brigade behaved with its usual gallantry,
capturing two stands of colors and a number of prisoners." (22)
In actuality, Brockenbrough's brigade did not perform
well on July 1. Its cautious advance against the 150th Pennsylvania allowed
the remainder of Stone's brigade to maul General Daniel's brigade, which was
attacking from the north side of Chambersburg Pike. This, coupled with the Virginians'
refusal to pursue the retreating enemy toward Seminary Ridge, calls the brigade's
effectiveness into question.
During the night of July 1, and most of July 2, the brigade occupied Seminary
Ridge with the remainder of the division. The second night, the brigade was
ordered to the right, stopping near the McMillan House. Sometime during the
next day, the men learned, they would have the dubious honor of storming the
strongly held Federal position on Cemetery Ridge. (23)
Even worse, the brigade was to occupy the vulnerable left flank of the attacking
column, with no supporting troops behind it. Brockenbrough was ordered to begin
his advance when Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis' Mississippi Brigade, on his right,
began its movement. For some odd reason, Brockenbrough decided to break his
brigade into two wings. This action was documented by Colonel Christian of the
55th Virginia, who stated that "Col. Brockenbrough came to me and said
he intended to divide the Brigade and said that the 55th and 47th must move
only at the orders of Col. [Robert H.] Mayo of the 47th, and that I must consider
myself under the command temporarily of Col. Mayo." Some have speculated
that the action was to provide greater oversight to the brigade--something that
was apparently lacking at Chancellorsville. While Mayo commanded the 47th and
55th Virginia on the left, Brockenbrough retained command of the 40th Virginia
and 22nd Virginia Battalion on the right, next to Davis. (24)
Davis' men stepped off about 3:00 p.m., and Brockenbrough ordered his wing forward.
However, the left side of the line never budged. Watching the right flank of
the brigade moving forward, Colonel Christian could not understand why his men
had not received orders to advance as well. Whether Brockenbrough noticed the
problem is not known, but one of General Pettigrew's aides did. Capt. Louis
Young offered to gallop over to the two regiments to get them moving. Pettigrew
demurred, telling him not to bother, as "it might follow [Brockenbrough's
brigade], and if it failed to do so it would not matter." According to
the staff officer, the brigade had been "so badly handled that it was in
a chronic state of demoralization and was not to be relied upon; it was virtually
of no value in a fight."(25)
Observing that the right half of the brigade was making rapid progress across
the field, Colonel Christian rode over to confer with Lt. Col. John W. Lyell
of the 47th Virginia. Colonel Mayo was nowhere to be found, and Brockenbrough's
orders were clear--"not to move till Col. Mayo said so." Seeing the
distance between the two wings lengthening, the two officers realized that they
could wait not longer. Orders were immediately issued to dash forward in an
effort to catch up with the right half of the brigade. The two regiments eventually
caught up with the remainder of the brigade, and subsequently advanced as a
cohesive unit, albeit with its left flank "dangling in the air."(26)
There is some debate over the number of men in the brigade at this time. Some
writers believed that despite the official returns, not more than five hundred
men remained in the ranks. These veterans moved steadily
forward. Suddenly, the thirty-one cannon on Cemetery Hill opened on the most
obvious target--the left of Pettigrew's line, i.e. Brockenbrough's brigade.
Shells began to find their mark in no time. Maj. T. W. Osborn of the Eleventh
Corps, commanding these batteries, wrote in his report:
The whole force of our artillery was brought to bear upon this column, and the havoc produced upon their ranks was truly surprising. The enemy's advance was most splendid, and for a considerable distance the only hindrance offered it was by the artillery, which broke their lines fearfully, as every moment showed that their advance under this concentrated artillery fire was most difficult; and though they made desperate efforts to advance in good order, were unable to do so, and I am convinced that the fire from the hill was one of the main auxiliaries in breaking the force of this grand charge.(27)
One of Osborn's battery commanders, Capt. Frederick M. Edgell of the 1st New Hampshire Light Battery, wrote that his oblique fire against Brockenbrough's brigade had a "destructive effect." Lt. Col. Franklin Sawyer of the 8th Ohio described the destructiveness of the cannon fire against Brockenbrough's men, writing:
They were at once enveloped in a dense cloud of smoke and dust. Arms, heads, blankets, guns, and knapsacks were thrown and tossed into the clear air. Their track, as they advanced, was strewn with dead and wounded. A moan went the storm of battle, but on they went, too much enveloped in smoke and dust now to permit us to distinguish their lines or movements, for the mass appeared more like a cloud of moving smoke and dust than a column of troops. Still it advanced amid the now deafening roar of artillery and storm of battle.(28)
A swale just beyond the
now burnt Bliss barn, about five hundred yards from the Federal line on Cemetery
Ridge, provided a measure of relief from the havoc raining upon the men. The
lines were reformed but many of the soldiers were apparently gripped with the
realization that to continue on was suicide. As the line again moved forward,
there were fewer Virginians in the ranks, as some elected to remain in the swale
for safety, while others took their chances darting back toward Seminary Ridge.
Sgt. William Faulconer of the 55th Virginia admitted that many refused to continue
because, "we could see it was no use." Shells continued to crash among
the ranks of the men who advanced once more toward Cemetery Ridge, and huge
gaps appeared in the line. Other holes appeared as men began to break ranks
and make for the rear. The remaining men, the bravest fighters, continued grimly
on, in what must have looked more like a skirmish line than a brigade at this
point.(29)
Without warning, a volley erupted from troops that had suddenly materialized
in front of them. The 8th Ohio had been on the picket line since the day before,
and their commander, Lt. Col. Franklin Sawyer, had requested to be relieved
several times, without success. Seeing Brockenbrough's men advance, Sawyer moved
his men in that direction, "and when the rebel line came within about 100
yards, we poured in a well-directed fire, which broke the rebel line, and it
soon fled in the wildest confusion."(30)
Lt. W. F. Dunaway of Brockenbrough's staff agreed, noting that, "I feel
no shame in recording that out of this corner the men without waiting for orders
turned and fled, for the bravest soldiers cannot endure to be shot at simultaneously
from front and side. They knew that to remain, or to advance, meant wholesale
death and captivity." While the remnants of the 55th Virginia were streaming
to the rear, the remainder of the brigade drew off to the right to avoid the
8th Ohio's volleys. Sawyer then "changed front forward on the left company,
thus presenting our front to the left flank of the advancing rebel column. Our
fire was poured into their flank with terrible effect for a few minutes...."
This fire, combined with that from Col. Thomas A. Smyth's brigade on Cemetery
Ridge, and the batteries on the hill, concentrated on Brockenbrough's line,
and soon "the whole mass gave way, some fleeing to the front, some to the
rear, and some through our lines, until the whole plain was covered with unarmed
rebels, waving coats, hats, and handkerchiefs in token of a wish to surrender."
Those who managed to flee, "threw away everything-cartridge boxes, waistbelts,
and haversacks--in their stampede.... They all seemed to extend their arms in
their flight, as if to assist their speed," recalled Thomas Galway of the
8th Ohio. Some of the fleeing men were heard to bitterly remark as they made
their way back to Seminary Ridge, "lf Old Jack [Stonewall Jackson] had
been here, it wouldn't have been like this." Lieutenant Dunaway wrote,
"The yankees had a fair opportunity to kill us all, and why did not do
it I cannot tell."(31)
The activities of the errant Colonel Mayo are not known,
but he did provide an exaggerated report on the battle. Stating that the brigade
did not number more than two hundred, he claims that it stopped midway between
the two hostile lines to help repel an enemy counterattack and to provide support
to the troops on the right. "We succeeded, however, in holding the enemy
in check until everything on our right had given way. Our brigade was the last
to leave field," he wrote. These outrageous claims were repeated after
the war by Colonel Christian, who wrote, "We remained out in that field
till all of the troops on our right had fallen back ... and did not retire until
AFTER the retreat had become general. (32)
New hostilities began immediately after the battle ended--a war of words and
finger pointing, much of it directed against Brockenbrough's brigade. Most of
the attacks came from the North Carolinians of Pettigrew's, Scales', and James
Lane's brigades, who denigrated the role of Brockenbrough's brigade in the charge
on July 3. This can be clearly seen in the account of William McLaurin of Lane's
brigade, when he wrote, "Brockenbrough's, Va., brigade did not come up
to its usual standard, and the shafts of detraction were hurled at all its comrades
under Pettigrew, on that account." Got. John Jones recounted Pettigrew's
reaction after the charge had been repelled, "With tears in his eyes he
spoke of the loss in his brigade, and then remarked, 'My noble brigade had gained
the enemy's works, and would have held them had not _____'s Brigade (names the
brigade), on the left, given way. Oh! Had they have known the consequences that
hung upon their action at that moment, they would have passed on."' Capt.
Lewis Young of Pettigrew's brigade, was much less charitable, writing that Brockenbrough's
men never really got into the charge at all, saying "it advanced to the
protection of some rifle pits in front of Seminary Ridge, but it took no part
in the charge." Continuing, he wrote, that Brockenbrough's brigade was,
"the only troops on the ground which really behaved badly." Other
accounts suggested that Brockenbrough's men fled as soon as the Federal artillery
opened fire on them. With much hyperbole, another member of Pettigrew's brigade
recounted an instance where one of Brockenbrough's wounded soldiers wandered
over to the North Carolinians for assistance, because there were "none
wounded but himself and none killed in his company."(33)
Part of the reason for these verbal attacks was to attempt to counterbalance
George E. Pickett's men's claims that Pettigrew's and Isaac R. Trimble's divisions
did not do their share on July 3--an assertion that was patently false. The
North Carolinians were also jealous that Pickett's men had garnered more than
their share of glory from the charge, and by attacking the behavior of Brockenbrough's
Virginians, they were also tarnishing the reputation of Pickett's Virginians.
The same cannot be said about the criticisms leveled by Brig. Gen. Joseph R.
Davis, who wrote after the war, "Col. Brockenbrough's Va. Brigade ought
to have been on my left, but it refused to advance." While the assertion
was false, it had a damaging effect on the Virginians. (34)
While these claims were refuted by Brockenbrough's men, they followed the brigade
through the years. Taking an impartial view, modern historian George Stewart
supported the Virginians, writing, "Actually the brigade did better than
the statements of its worst detractors suggest, as they did advance as a unit
to beyond the Bliss farm." Support also came from the once hated Union
side, when one Union soldier observed that, "no human flesh could have
stood in front of the terrible cannon fire ... on the point occupied by Brockenbrough's
Brigade."
The evidence also tends to support a more sympathetic view. Hit by a brutal
cannonade, which ripped the line apart, many of Brockenbrough's men appeared
to have continued their advance. The flank fire from the 8th Ohio, however,
was difficult to handle. In fact, few units could have withstood such an attack,
no matter how high their morale. One only needs to recall the flank attack on
July 1 that forced the storied Iron Brigade and Chapman Biddle's brigade to
retreat. Fate also went against the brigade, as it had the misfortune of occupying
the most vulnerable part of the line. (35)
The broken brigade returned to its position on Seminary Ridge that afternoon
and remained there through July 4. The retreat back toward Virginia began that
evening. Unfortunately, the brigade's bad luck continued to follow it during
the retreat. Federal cavalry caught up with Heth's division on July 14, near
Falling Waters. The cavalrymen made several ill-fated attacks on Brockenbrough's
brigade, all of which were successfully repelled. Then a terrible mistake was
made. According to Lieutenant Dunaway, the color-bearer of the 47th exclaimed,
"come on boys; it's nothing but cavalry" and ran forward, "showing
more bravery than intelligence or discipline." Not to be outdone, the other
color-bearers also shot forward. Riding over to Colonel Brockenbrough, Dunaway
requested that he recall the color-bearers. To his horror, Brockenbrough "directed
me to order all the men to join the colors." Many of the men refused to
budge, claiming that their "muskets were unfit for action." While
Dunaway and other members of the brigade moved forward, Brockenbrough turned,
and joined the rest of Heth's division, as it marched away to safety. Outnumbered
and unsupported, the small brigade was overwhelmed and all of its flags and
many of the men were captured. The relatively few survivors made their way back
toward the rest of Heth's division. After this fiasco, the 40th Virginia numbered
fewer than one hundred men. The brigade had essentially been destroyed-its remnants
were later consolidated with Archer's survivors. (36)
Although Brockenbrough's men "much loved & respected" him, his
leadership of the brigade was uninspired. As a result, Brockenbrough was relieved
of command of the brigade in July of 1863, and returned to what was left of
the 40th Virginia. In his place, Henry H. Walker, a young West Point graduate,
was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and given command of the consolidated
brigade. This outraged Brockenbrough and his supporters, because Walker had
served as his lieutenant colonel in the 40th Virginia. In an extraordinary act,
fifty commissioned officers from the brigade signed a letter to Gen. Robert
E. Lee on July 19, 1863, in which they "respectfully protested" against
the assignment of Walker. They could not:
understand why an inferior.., should be promoted over his superior, when Col. Brokenbrough has gallantly commanded this Brigade in every action since 2nd Manassas, and Genl. Walker has never participated in but one engagement. We have no personal objection to Genl. Walker, but cannot be silent spectators to the direct insult and gross injustice done to Colonel Brockenbrough....
The letter ended with a plea that
Brockenbrough should remain in command, even if he was not promoted, but they,
"always hoped [he] would be promoted."(37)
For his part, Brockenbrough called Walker a "mere youth" and expressed
the strong feeling that he had engaged in "puerile exertions to take the
brigade away from him." These pleas fell on deaf ears, and Brockenbrough
resigned his commission on January 21, 1864. (38)
So ended a chapter in the history of Gettysburg. The sad story of a brigade
that did the best it could despite its prior heavy losses, low morale, and poor
overall leadership.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Bradley M. Gottfried holds a Ph.D. in Zoology and is President of Sussex County
Community College (New Jersey). His book, Stopping Pickett--The History of the
Philadelphia Brigade, has recently been published by White Mane (1999), and
he revised Stackpole and Nye's The Battle of Gettysburg--A Guided Tour (Stackpole,
1998). He is currently completing a brigade-level history of the battle of Gettysburg.
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1 . Alfred Scales account, David L. Ladd and Audrey J. Ladd, The Bachelder Papers:
Gettysburg in Their Own Words, 3 vols. (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1994), 3:1697.
2. Joseph Davis account, Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3:1800.
3. John W. Busey and David G. Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg (Hightstown, New Jersey: Longstreet House, 1986), p. 176.
4. Robert Krick, 40th Virginia (Lynchburg, Virginia: H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 29; Stewart Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1988), pp.75, 217; Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), 2:354, 702; George R. Stewart, Pickett 's Charge: A Microhistory (Boston: Houghton Mifnin Company, 1959), pp. 38-39.
5. Homer D. Musselman, 47rh Virginia (Lynchburg, Virginia: H. E. Howard, 1991), pp. 48-49; Krick, 40th Virginia, p. 25.
6. Krick, 40th Virginia, p. 25; 55th Virginia Infantry (Brockenbrough) account of Col. W. S. Christian (copy in 55th Virginia folder, GNMP).
7. Account of Col. W. S. Christian.
8. Ibid.
9.Jaquelin M. Meredith, "The First Day at Gettysburg," Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond, Virginia: Published by the Society, 1896), 24:184.
10. Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 49; Richard O'Sullivan, 55ith Virginia (Lynchburg, Virginia: H. E. Howard, 1989), p. 53; Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot, 1995), pt. 1, vol. 5, pp. 414-15.
11. United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 332 (Hereafter cited as OR. All subsequent references are to series 1.); D. Scott Hartwig, "The Defense of McPherson's Ridge," Gettysburg Magazine, no. 1 (July 1989): 21-24.
12. OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 274; David G. Martin, Gettysburg: July I (Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, Inc., 1996), p. 368.
13. Thomas Chamberlin, History of the One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment. Pennsylvania Volunteers (Philadelphia: J. ·B. Lippincott co.; 1895; reprint, Baltimore: Butternut & flue, 1986), pp. 128-29.
14. Pennsylvania Gettysburg Battlefield Commission, Pennsylvania at Gettysburg: Ceremonies at the Dedication of the Monuments Erected by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Mark the Positions of the Pennsylvania Commands Engaged in the Rattle, ed. John P. Nicholson, 2 vols. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: William Staqley Ray, 1904), 2:749-50; Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 50; Martin, Gettysburg:July I, p. 368; OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 274.
15. Nicholson, Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 2:750.
16. OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 347.
17. Ibid., p. 280; Martin, Gettysburg: July I, p. 370.
18. OR, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 670.
19. Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, 2:750; OR, vol. 27, pt. I, p. 347.
20. Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 50; OR, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 670; Alfred Scales account, Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3:1697.
21. Harry W. Pfanz, "The Regiment Saved, the Colors Lost," p. 40, (copy in 55th Virginia rile, GNMP); O'Sullivan, 55th Virginia, p. 54.
22. Col. W. S. Christian account, GNMP; OR, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 638.
23. Second Day Bachelder Maps; Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 50; OR, vol. 27, pt. 2, p. 670. :
24. Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 51; Col. W. S. Christian account, GNMP. Krick, 40th Virginia, p. 27; Welter Clark, ed., Histories of Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Greet War 1861-1865, 5 vols. (Raleigh, North Carolina: E. M. Uzzel, 1901), 5:125.
26.Col. W. S· Christian account, GNMP. Several of Brockenbrough's regimental histories (O'Sullivan, 55th Virginia, p. 55; Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 51) also state that the right wing was late in starting, as "Davis missed his cue." .This appears to be false.
27. OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 750.
28. Ibid., p. 893; Franklin Sawyer, A Military History of the 8th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry. its Rattles, Marches and Army Movements (CLeveland: Fairbanks and Co., 1881,; reprint, Huntington, West Virginia: Blue Acorn Press, 1994), p. 131.
29. Krick, 40th Virginia, p. 29; O'Sullivan, 55th Virginia, p. 55; Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 53; OR Supplement, pt. 1, vol. 5, p. 415
30. Franklin Sawyer account, Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 3:1132; OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, P. 462
31. Wayland F. Dunaway, Reminiscences of a Rebel (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1913), pp. 92-93; Franklin Sawyer, The Eighth Ohio al Gettysburg: Address of ... Reunion al Columbus. Ohio, 1888 (Washington: E. J. Gray, 1889), p. 7; OR, vol. 27, pt. 1, p. 462; Thomas F. Galway, The Valiant Hours: Narrative of "Captain Brevel, " An Irish-American in the Army of the Potomac (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1961), p. 118; Musselman, 47th Virginia, p. 53.
32. OR Supplement, pt. 1, vol. 5, p. 415.
33. Clark, North Carolina Regiments, 2:44, and 5:125, 130; OR Supplement, pt. 1, vol. 5, pp. 410, 412.
34. Joseph Davis account, Ladd, The Bachelder papers, 3:1800.
35. Stewart, Pickett's Charge, pp. 189-90.
36. Dunaway, Reminiscences, on. 98-99.; Krick, 40th Virginia, on. 31-34.
37. Krick, 40th Virginia, no. 31-34.
38. William C. Davis and Julia Hoffman, eds., The Confederate General, 6 vols. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: National Historical Society, 1991), 6:85; Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War, p. 75.